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The interaction theory of social cognition contends that intersubjective 
interaction is characterized by both immersion and irreducibility. This 
motivates a question about autonomy and self-agency: If I am always caught up 
in processes of interaction, and interaction always goes beyond me and my 
ultimate control, is there any room for self-agency? I outline an answer to this 




In regard to social cognition, there has been growing opposition to the 
standard theory-of-mind (ToM) views, usually referred to as theory theory (TT) 
and simulation theory (ST). I have defended an alternative approach: 
―interaction theory‖ (IT). IT is based on evidence from both phenomenology 
and developmental psychology, and it offers an alternative to the simulation 
interpretation of the neuroscience of mirror neurons. An important part of IT 
is its emphasis on ‗strong interaction‘ (Gallagher in press; also see De Jaeger et 
al. 2010) – a concept of interaction that is a seemingly pervasive feature of 
intersubjectivity. In this paper I take a closer look at this concept and raise 
questions about what appears to be a threat to the notion of self-agency. The 
question is: If we are so interactively interdependent on others in our everyday 
practical and communicative behaviors, is there any room for autonomy? 
 
 
INTERACTION THEORY (IT) AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO TT AND ST 
In psychology, philosophy of mind, and more recently, in the neurosciences, 
studies of how one person understands and interrelates with another person 
 
* Department of Philosophy, University of Central Florida – Institute of Simulation and Training 
– University of Hertfordshire – University of Copenhagen 
56 Humana.Mente – Issue 15 – January 2011 
have been dominated by two main approaches: theory theory and simulation 
theory. The major tenets of TT are based on scientific experiments that show 
that children develop an understanding of other minds around the age of four. 
One version of TT claims that this understanding is based on an innately 
specified, domain specific mechanism designed for ‗reading‘ other minds (e.g., 
Baron-Cohen 1995, Leslie 1991). An alternative version claims that the child 
attains this ability through a course of development in which the child tests and 
learns from the social environment (e.g., Gopnik and Meltzoff 1997). 
Common to both versions is the idea that children attain their understanding of 
other minds through the use of folk or commonsense psychology which they 
use to make theoretical inferences about certain entities to which they have no 
access, namely, the mental states of other people. When we make such 
inferences and attribute specific mental states to others, we are said to be 
mentalizing or mindreading.  
ST, in contrast, argues that rather than theorizing or making inferences 
about the other person‘s mind, we use our own mental experience as an 
internal model for the other mind (e.g., Gordon 1986, 1995; Heal 1986, 
1998a, 1998b). To understand the other person, I simulate the thoughts or 
feelings that I would experience if I were in the situation of the other, 
exploiting my own motivational and emotional resources. I imagine what must 
be going on in the other person‘s mind; or I create in my own mind pretend 
beliefs, desires or strategies that I use to understand the other‘s behavior. My 
source for these simulations is not a theory that I have. Rather, I have a real 
model of the mind at my immediate disposal, that is, I have my own mind, and I 
can use it to generate and run simulations. I simply run through the sequence 
or pattern of behavior or the decision-making process that I would engage in if 
I were faced with the situation in question. I do it ‗off line‘, however. That is, 
my imaginary rehearsal does not lead to actualizing the behavior on my part. 
Finally, I attribute this pattern to the other person who is actually in that 
situation.  
Despite extensive debates between proponents of TT and ST, respectively, 
TT and ST share three basic suppositions. The three suppositions are these. 
(1) The problem of social cognition is due to the lack of access that we 
have to the other person‘s mental states. Since we cannot directly 
perceive the other‘s thoughts, feelings, or intentions, we need some 
extra-perceptual cognitive process (mindreading or mentalizing) that 
will allow us to infer or simulate what they are. 
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(2) Our normal everyday stance toward the other person is a third-person, 
observational stance. Based on what we observe we use mindreading 
to explain or predict their behaviors. 
(3) These mentalizing processes constitute our primary and pervasive way 
of understanding others. 
There are also a number of unsolved problems associated with these ToM 
approaches. I won‘t go into detail here, but I‘ll give a brief indication of some 
of these problems.1 First, some (but not all) theorists claim the process of 
theoretical inference or simulation is conscious or introspective (e.g., 
Goldman 1995; Goldman 2006, p. 147); but there is no phenomenological 
evidence that this is so, and there should be if the process is both consciously 
explicit and pervasive. That is, we should be able to catch ourselves in the act, 
but we don‘t. The second problem is what I refer to as the starting problem, a 
version of the frame problem. For TT, the question is how do I know what 
piece of folk psychology (what rule, or what platitude) actually applies to the 
case at hand. For ST, one can see the problem clearly in the following 
description of a simulation routine provided by Nichols and Stich:  
The basic idea of what we call the ‗off-line simulation theory‘ is that in 
predicting and explaining people‘s behavior we take our own decision making 
system ‗off-line‘, supply it with ‗pretend‘ inputs that have the same content as 
the beliefs and desires of the person whose behavior we‘re concerned with, and 
let it make a decision on what to do. (Nichols and Stich 2003, pp. 39-40) 
Simulation as a form of mindreading is supposed to provide insight into the 
beliefs and desires of the other person, but it seems that we need to know the 
content of those mental states in order to do the simulation. Neither TT nor ST 
provide a good answer to the starting problem.  
A third problem concerns diversity and applies specifically to ST. Keysers 
and Gazzola describe simulation in the following way: 
In [simulation] cases, observing what other people do or feel is therefore 
transformed into an inner representation of what we would do or feel in a 
similar situation — as if we would be in the skin of the person we observe. 
(Keysers and Gazzola 2006, p. 390) 
But how does knowing what we would do help us know what someone else 
 
1 See Gallagher 2005 and 2007 for more detail. 
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would do? Indeed, many times we are in a situation where we see what 
someone is doing, and know that we would do it differently, or perhaps, not do 
it at all. A fourth problem concerns development. The kind of inferential or 
simulation processes found in explicit versions of TT and ST are too 
cognitively complex to account for the infant‘s ability to understand the 
intentions of others. Yet, as we‘ll see below, there is a large amount of evidence 
to support the idea that young infants are able to grasp the intentions of others.  
The developmental problem is addressed by a recent version of ST that 
relies on an interpretation of mirror neuron (MN) activation as a form of 
simulation. In this case, simulation is said to be fast and automatic. If MNs are 
active in young infants, then the developmental problem does not apply to this 
version of ST. Since activation of MNs are non-conscious, the issue of 
phenomenological evidence is irrelevant, and there is no starting problem. So-
called neuronal ST, then solves all of the above problems except perhaps the 
diversity problem. But there are other problems involved in neural ST. One 
concerns the fact that simulation is originally defined as involving pretense. As 
Nichols and Stich make clear in the above quote, simulation involves the use of 
pretend beliefs and desires. We pretend to be in the other person‘s shoes in 
order to run the routine. But the notion of pretense does not apply in the case 
of MNs. Indeed, most theorists claim that MNs are neutral with respect to who 
the agent is, and agent-neutrality is not consistent with the notion of pretense. 
MNs can‘t account for me pretending to be you if in fact there is no distinction 
between me and you at that level. As a result, there have been attempts to shift 
the definition of simulation to involve a simple matching (e.g., Goldman 2006, 
Rizzolatti et al. 2001). My motor system is said to go into a state matching 
yours when I see you perform an action. But the neurological details do not 
bear this out2, and it seems counter-intuitive if we think of how we interact with 
others. In the majority of cases we are not imitating or mimicking others; 
rather, our motor systems are busy supporting responses or complementary 
actions.  
This is not an exhaustive list of problems with TT and ST, but it should be 
sufficient to see why we might want to find a better account of social cognition. 
Interaction theory is proposed as that better account. IT challenges the three 
suppositions associated with ToM approaches. In their place IT argues for the 
following propositions. 
 
2 See, e.g., Catmur et al. 2007, Dinstein et al. 2008. 
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(1) Other minds are not hidden away and inaccessible. The other person‘s 
intentions, emotions, and dispositions are expressed in their 
embodied behavior. In most cases of everyday interaction no inference 
or projection to mental states beyond those expressions and behaviors 
is necessary.  
(2) Our normal everyday stance toward the other person is not third-
person, detached observation; it is second-person interaction. We are 
not primarily spectators or observers of other people‘s actions; for the 
most part we are interacting with them in some communicative action, 
on some project, in some pre-defined relation; or we are treating them 
as potential interactors. 
(3) Our primary and pervasive way of understanding others does not 
involve mentalizing or mindreading; in fact, these are rare and 
specialized abilities that we develop only on the basis of a more 
embodied engagement with others. 
IT emphasizes the role of communicative and narrative practices, and it appeals 
to evidence from developmental studies, starting with primary and secondary 
intersubjectivity (Trevarthen 1979; Trevarthen and Hubley 1978). 
 Primary intersubjectivity (starting from birth) – Sensory-motor 
abilities – enactive perceptual capacities in processes of interaction 
 Secondary intersubjectivity (starting around 1 year of age) – joint 
attention, shared contexts, pragmatic engagements, acting with others 
 Communicative and narrative competencies (starting from 2-4 years) 
– communicative and narrative practices that represent intersubjective 
interactions, motives, and reasons and provide a more nuanced and 
sophisticated social understanding. 
In this paper I will begin with a focus on primary and secondary 
intersubjectivity, but I‘ll return the issue of narrative competence. I take this 
strategy because I first want to focus on the nature of interaction itself, and 
most of the essential aspects can be grasped in primary and secondary 
intersubjectivity. When it comes to the question of self-agency, however, 
narrative will be shown to play an important role. 
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERACTION 
Primary intersubjectivity consists of the innate or early-developing sensory-
motor capacities that bring us into relation with others and allow us to interact 
with them. These capacities are manifested at the level of perceptual 
experience -- we see or more generally perceive in the other person‘s bodily 
movements, gestures, facial expressions, eye direction, etc. what they intend 
and what they feel, and we respond with our own bodily movements, gestures, 
facial expressions, gaze, etc. From birth the infant is pulled into these 
interactive processes. This can be seen in the very early behavior of the 
newborn. Infants from birth are capable of perceiving and imitating facial 
gestures presented by another (Meltzoff and Moore 1977, 1994). Importantly, 
this kind of imitation is not an automatic or mechanical procedure; Csibra and 
Gergely (2009) have shown, for example, that the infant is more likely to 
imitate only if the other person is attending to it.  
Primary intersubjectivity can be specified in more detail as the infant 
develops. At 2 months, for example, infants are able to follow the gaze of the 
other person, to see that the other person is looking in a certain direction, and 
to sense what the other person sees (which is sometimes the infant herself), in a 
way that throws the intention of the other person into relief (Baron-Cohen 
1995; Maurer and Barrera 1981). In addition, second-person interaction is 
evidenced by the timing and emotional response of infants‘ behavior. Infants 
«vocalize and gesture in a way that seems [affectively and temporally] ‗tuned‘ to 
the vocalizations and gestures of the other person» (Gopnik and Meltzoff 
1997, p. 131). At 5-7 months, infants are able to detect correspondences 
between visual and auditory information that specify the expression of 
emotions (Walker 1982; Hobson 1993, 2002). At 6 months infants start to 
perceive grasping as goal directed, and at 10-11 months infants are able to 
parse some kinds of continuous action according to intentional boundaries 
(Baldwin and Baird 2001; Baird and Baldwin 2001; Woodward and 
Sommerville 2000). They start to perceive various movements of the head, the 
mouth, the hands, and more general body movements as meaningful, goal-
directed movements (Senju et al. 2006). 
Developmental studies show the very early appearance of, and the 
importance of, interactive attunement in the form of timing and coordination in 
the intersubjective context. In still face experiments, for example, infants are 
engaged in a normal face-to-face interaction with an adult for 1 to 2 minutes, 
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followed by the adult assuming a neutral facial expression. This is followed by 
another normal face-to-face interaction. Infants between 3 and 6 months 
become visibly discouraged and upset during the still face period (Tronick 
2007, Tronick et al. 1978). The importance of interactive touch has also been 
demonstrated in the still-person effect (Muir 2002). 
Murray and Trevarthen (1985) have also shown the importance of the 
mother‘s live interaction with 2-month old infants in their double TV monitor 
experiment where mother and infant interact by means of a live television link. 
The infants engage in lively interaction in this situation. When presented with 
a recorded replay of their mother‘s previous actions, however, they quickly 
disengage and become distracted and upset. These results have been 
replicated, eliminating alternative explanations such as infants‘ fatigue or 
memory problems (Nadel et al. 1999, Stormark and Braarud 2004).  
Primary intersubjectivity is not something that disappears after the first year 
of life. It is not a stage that we leave behind, and it is not, as Greg Currie 
suggests, a set of precursor states «that underpin early intersubjective 
understanding, and make way for the development of later theorizing or 
simulation» (Currie 2008, p. 212, my emphasis).3 Rather, citing both 
behavioral and phenomenological evidence, IT argues that we don‘t leave 
primary intersubjectivity behind; the processes involved here don‘t ―make 
way‖ for the purportedly more sophisticated mindreading processes – these 
embodied interactive processes continue to characterize our everyday 
encounters even as adults. That is, we continue to understand others in strong 
interactional terms, facilitated by our recognition of facial expressions, 
gestures, postures, and actions as meaningful. 
Scientific experiments bear this out. Point-light experiments (actors in the 
dark wearing point lights on their joints, presenting abstract outlines of 
emotional and action postures), for example, show that not only children 
(although not autistic children) but also adults perceive emotion even in 
movement that offers minimal information (Hobson and Lee 1999, Dittrich et 
al. 1996). Close analysis of facial expression, gesture and action in everyday 
contexts shows that as adults we continue to rely on embodied interactive 
abilities to understand the intentions and actions of others and to accomplish 
interactive tasks (Lindblom 2007, Lindblom and Ziemke 2007).  
 
3 Cf. Baron-Cohen 1991 and 1995. 
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By the end of the first year of life, infants have a non-mentalizing, 
perceptually-based, embodied and pragmatic understanding of the intentions 
and dispositions of other persons. With the advent of joint attention (at around 
9 months) and secondary intersubjectivity (at around 1 year) infants start to use 
context and enter into situations of participatory sense-making (De Jaegher 
and Di Paolo 2007). That is, infants begin to co-constitute the meaning of the 
world in their interactions with others. We start to understand the world 
through our interactions with others, and we gain a more nuanced 
understanding of others by situating their actions in contexts that are defined 
by both pragmatic tasks and cultural practices.  
Meaning and emotional significance is co-constituted in the interaction – 
not in the private confines of one or the other‘s head. The analyses of social 
interactions in shared activities, in working together, in communicative 
practices, and so on, show that agents unconsciously coordinate their 
movements, gestures, and speech acts (Issartel et al. 2007, Kendon 1990, 
Lindblom 2007). In the contextualized practices of secondary intersubjectivity 
timing and emotional attunement continue to be important as we coordinate 
our perception-action sequences; our movements are coupled with changes in 
velocity, direction and intonation of the movements and utterances of the 
speaker.  
The kind of embodied and contextualized interaction that we find in 
primary and secondary intersubjectivity is what I am calling ‗strong 
interaction‘. In strong interaction, our movements are often synchronized in 
resonance with others, following either in-phase or phase-delayed behaviour, 
and in rhythmic co-variation of gestures, facial or vocal expressions (Fuchs and 
De Jaegher 2009). This kind of intersubjective interaction involves 
coordination but does not imply perfect synchronization. Non-autistic infants 
from 3-months of age prefer slight modulations (time-delays) and imperfect 
contingency in responses (Gergely 2001). As De Jaegher (2008) suggests, 
continuous movements between synchronised, desynchronised and the states 
in-between, drive the process. Attunement, loss of attunement, and re-
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A CLOSER LOOK AT INTERACTION 
I want to focus on two aspects of strong interaction: immersion and 
irreducibility. The first involves the idea that interaction is not something that 
we decide to enter into. Rather, it is, as the existentialists might say, something 
that we are thrown into, before anything like a decision is even possible. This is 
closely tied to the fact that interaction is primarily, that is, from the very 
beginning, embodied – a fact (or the facticity) of our physical nature, and 
specifically, of the kind of body that we have and the contingencies of our 
earliest existence. There is, in effect, no scientific mystery to this 
phenomenon, even if in everyday experience it seems a mystery in terms of why 
for the most part we cannot help but engage in it. The second aspect involves 
the idea that strong interaction is irreducible to the individuals involved.  
I start with a question related to the first aspect, namely the question of the 
origin of interaction. Merleau-Ponty points to the bodily nature of interaction 
with his concept of intercorporeity (Merleau-Ponty 1962, p. 352). What I 
want to suggest is that intersubjective interaction ultimately derives from a 
more primary intercorporeal interaction.  
We know the principle from neuroscience, movement influences 
morphology (Edelman 1992, Sheets-Johnstone 1998): brain development 
results from the system as a whole adapting to new levels of organization at 
more peripheral levels, rather than the neurological developments unfolding to 
‗allow‘ increasing proprioceptive capacities (Van der Meer and Van der Weel 
1995). Consider the variety of developmental processes that follow this 
principle. For example, there is good evidence that both (1) a primitive 
proprioceptive registration of one‘s bodily movement, and (2) a differentiation 
between self and non-self develop prenatally (see Gallagher 1996). For 
example, proprioceptors in the muscles (muscle spindles) first appear at 9 
weeks gestational age (Humphrey 1964); parts of the vestibular system 
develop as early as the fourth month of gestation (Jouen and Gapenne 1995); 
and cortical connections necessary for body-schematic proprioceptive 
processes are in place by 26 weeks gestational age. In addition, the 
differentiation between self and non-self in the later-term fetus is evidenced 
across a number of studies of fetal behavioral reaction to various stimuli. In 
response to auditory stimuli, as early as 24 weeks gestational age, fetal heart 
rate changes; and after 25 weeks, the fetus responds by blinking its eyes or 
moving its limbs. Cortical response to such stimuli has been demonstrated in 
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premature infants between 24-29 weeks gestational age (Fifer and Moon 
1988). Differential responsiveness in the late-term fetus, signals a preference 
for some sounds (such as the mother‘s voice) rather than others (DeCasper and 
Spence 1986). Bright light directed on the lower abdomen of the mother in the 
third trimester can elicit fetal eye blinks (Emory and Toomey 1988), and fetal 
facial movements prompted by music or voice may be indicative of a similar 
differential awareness (Birnholz 1988). And we know that what Aristotle called 
the most basic sense, the tactile sense, develops early in the fetus, with cortical 
pathways intact by 20-24 weeks gestational age, with a differential registration 
between self-touching and being touched even earlier (Glass 2005). 
Even before the development of full-fledged proprioceptive and tactile 
senses, however, the fetus is already moving. At twelve weeks gestational age, 
there is evidence of spontaneous and repetitious movements – e.g., movement 
of the hand to the mouth occurs multiple times an hour from this time (De 
Vries et al. 1982; Tajani and Ianniruberto 1990). At ten weeks gestational age 
fetuses display structured bodily movements which they develop through 
habituation (Krasnegor et al. 1998); for example, regular mouth opening and 
closing, swallowing, and movement in response to stimuli such as the mother‘s 
laugh or cough. 
The first movements to occur are sideward bendings of the head. […] At 9-10 
weeks [gestational] age complex and generalized movements occur. These are 
the so-called general movements […] and the startles. Both include the whole 
body, but the general movements are slower and have a complex sequence of 
involved body parts, while the startle is a quick, phasic movement of all limbs 
and trunk and neck. (Prechtl 2001) 
Two kinds of movement are involved here: early fetal movement, which is 
spontaneous and repetitive and starts out as a reflex that unfolds genetically 
(De Vries et al. 1982); and early fetal movement that appears regulated and 
practiced – i.e., non-reflex (Krasnegor et al. 1998) – and that starts out as a 
response to stimuli. Setting aside the question of which of these come first, we 
can say that at some point in early fetal motility responsive movement comes 
along.4 The question is: To what is this movement a response? What is the 
 
4 I note here a recent study by Zoia et al. (2007) on intentional or directed movement in the fetus. 
Zoia et al. examined kinematic patterns of foetal movements showing that at 22 weeks hand to mouth 
and hand to head movement involved straighter and more accurately aimed trajectories with 
acceleration and deceleration phases consistent with target size and sensitivity. Thus, «by 22 weeks of 
gestation the movements seem to show the recognizable form of intentional actions, with kinematic 
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origination of this movement that helps to set the train of development in 
motion? The answer is that this kind of movement is a reaction to the mother‘s 
bodily movement – a kind of intercorporeal interaction. 
It is likely that these earliest regulated movements, which are prior to 
proprioceptive capacity, are a response within and to, the maternal body in her 
regulated and habituated, body schematic movement. […] Add to physical 
movement the regular maternal heart beat, digestion, and breathing and we can 
see that the intrauterine world is not only a moving but quite rhythmic or 
regulated animate world. (Lymer 2010, p. 230) 
This is not yet intersubjective interaction (the mother may not even know she‘s 
pregnant this early; and there is no claim that the fetus is an experiencing 
subject), but it is an intercorporeal interaction – a non-conscious motor 
coupling between mother and fetus driven toward and then driven by 
proprioception and touch. The point I want to make here is that whatever the 
moment of the awakening of consciousness – whether that is prenatal (at 
around 26 weeks gestational age) or later than that – and wherever we might 
locate the earliest aspect of self-awareness, this kind of intercorporeal 
interaction predates that, so that we find ourselves already immersed in 
interactive processes that prefigure the intersubjective ones found in primary 
intersubjectivity. 
To this immersion I want to add that the primary and secondary 
intersubjective interactions that we find in infancy are more than capacities or 
mechanisms that belong to the individuals involved in interaction. They are not 
based simply on ―first-order mechanisms‖ (Buckner et al. 2009) that we find in 
each individual, because they are not reducible to the sum of individual 
capacities (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007, De Jaegher et al. 2010). In the case 
of intersubjective interaction, 1 + 1 > 2. This is what De Jaegher and Di Paolo 
(2007) mean by saying that interaction has some degree of autonomy. The 
interaction in intersubjective contexts goes beyond each participant; it results 
in something (the creation of meaning) that goes beyond what each individual 
qua individual can bring to the process – just as when two people dance the 
tango, something dynamic is created that neither one could create on their 
 
patterns that depend on the goal of the action, suggesting a surprisingly advanced level of motor 
planning» (Zoia et al. 2007, p, 217). Also see Becher 2004 : «Purposive movement depends on brain 
maturation. This begins at about 18 weeks‘ gestation and progressively replaces reflex movements, 
which disappear by about 8 months after birth […]» 
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own. Moreover, as we have just seen in regard to the origins of interaction, we 
are in the tango before we even know it.  
So, not just in its origins, but as an ongoing process, interaction has a 
certain kind of irreducibility; it goes beyond the individual participants. In 
cases were one person is totally in control of the other person (if total control is 
ever possible), there is no interaction in this specific sense. The characteristics 
of immersion and irreducibility motivate the question about individual 
autonomy – self-agency. Merleau-Ponty talks about the infant getting caught 
up in the ―whirlwind of language‖ – but prior to that the infant is caught up in 
the whirlwind of interaction – and even as adults we remain in that whirlwind. 
And within that whirlwind, does the irreducibility of interaction leave any room 
for self-agency or individual autonomy? If I, always already, even before birth, 
am caught up in a whirlwind of interaction, and that interaction always goes 
beyond me and my ultimate control, is there really any room for self-agency? 
 
 
SELF-AGENCY AND THE NARRATIVE SELF 
There are current lively debates about self-agency and related concepts of 
freedom, free will, intention formation, and the sense of agency, with a variety 
of positions being staked out. From materialist and reductionist perspectives 
numerous theorists argue that self-agency is an illusion. They point to 
neuroscientific data (e.g., the Libet experiments that seem to show that the 
brain knows what we are going to do before we, as conscious individuals, do) 
or to the results of psychological experiments (e.g., Wegner 2002, Pockett 
2006); or they suggest that if we do have free will, we need a subpersonal 
explanation of it that shows how it is generated in the individual brain (Spence 
1996). Those who defend free will also often appeal to processes that are in the 
head (intention formation, reflective decision-making, or the 
phenomenological sense of agency, e.g., Pacherie 2008, Stephens and 
Graham 2000), or to mental causation, (Searle 1983, Lowe 1999). These 
approaches – whether they dismiss or defend the notion of free will – follow a 
traditional view that conceives of self-agency (or the lack of it) as a matter of 
individual subjectivity. Free will is either in the individual system or it is not. 
Even those theories that take social phenomena into account often use the 
individual as a measure of whether free will exists. For example, social 
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determinists argue that individual free will doesn‘t exist precisely because the 
individual is fully determined by our social interactions, cultural forces, etc.  
In general, then, discussions of freedom/free will/self-agency focus on the 
individual – the question is framed that way, for example, if we ask about 
individual autonomy. I want to suggest, however, that in response to the 
question about self-agency, motivated by the account of strong interaction, we 
can conceive of self-agency in different terms by conceiving of the agent as 
something other than an individual who either has or does not have free will. If 
we view the agent as someone who emerges from intercorporeal interactions, 
and develops in social interactions with others, then we have a good model for 
speaking about self-agency in a system that is not reducible to a simple 
individual. On this model, self-agency – and a proper sense of freedom (which 
comes along with a proper sense of responsibility) – can be found only in the 
context of social interaction, where our intentions are formed in or out of our 
interactions with others. 
Clearly, we learn to act from watching and interacting with others as they 
act in the world. We learn our own action-possibilities from others. Through 
our interactions with others we generate shared intentions and form our own 
intentions out of the same fabric. In this context, how can we explain self-
agency?  
It is at this point that I want to point out the importance of that aspect of 
interaction theory that involves communicative and narrative competencies 
(Gallagher and Hutto 2008). Beyond the processes of primary and secondary 
intersubjectivity, communicative and narrative practices allow for a certain 
volitional space to open up – the possibility of taking a critical perspective on 
ourselves. Narrative allows us to reflectively locate our interactions in what 
Bruner calls the ‗landscape of action‘ and ‗the landscape of consciousness‘ 
(Bruner 1986). That is, through narrative, we can reflect on our actions and 
interactions, and on what our motives for such actions might be.  
In this process, and specifically in autobiographical (or self-) narrative, 
narrative distance, a concept that goes back to Aristotle‘s Poetics, is 
established between the self who narrates and the self who is narrated. This 
distance allows for the possibility of what Harry Frankfurt (1971) calls second-
order volitions – that is, volitions in which we consider or evaluate our own 
first-order action volitions. On Frankfurt‘s view, this capacity for second-order 
volitions, or what Charles Taylor (1989) calls the possibility for a strong 
evaluation of our own desires, is essential for moral personhood. From an 
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interactionist perspective, this is possible only as a result of social interaction 
processes, in social settings where we act and interact, and where we exercise 
our communicative and narrative practices. 
What we call autonomy, then, is not constituted in just an internal intra-
individual negotiation made by an agent with respect to herself, but is 
inextricably interwoven into and out of our relationships with others. In this 
regard, self-agency becomes a matter of degree rather than an all or nothing 
issue. Some people arrange their lives with others, or find themselves in such 
arrangements, so that they have a high degree of freedom – a greater range of 
possibilities than others who find themselves in social relationships, or 
cultures, or institutions where they are prevented from acting freely.  
There is nothing new in this thought: our social interactions and 
arrangements are such that they either promote freedom or prevent it. 
Whatever self-agency is, it‘s weaved out of this fabric of interaction; not a 
characteristic of the individual; but a characteristic of a set of relationships. In 
some of my interactions I am freer than in others. Some arrangements support 
self-agency, and some do not. I could say, without contradiction, that I am free 
and I am not free – but only in the sense that my self-agency is constituted in 
my different relations differently. 
It‘s also the case that certain interactions can make one participant free and 
the other a slave. So the question that derives directly from conceiving of 
intersubjective interaction as a primary force in shaping our cognitive, 
emotional, and social life is not the metaphysical question: Do I as an individual 
have free will? It is rather the political question: who is free (or more free) and 
who is not, and why? The political question is a pragmatic and critical one, 




With regard to discussions of social cognition, shifting away from theory-of-
mind approaches, such as theory theory and simulation theory, and taking up 
the interaction theory and the emphasis on intersubjective interaction also 
involves shifting away from conceptions of self-agency that are reducible to 
neural or mental or strictly individual processes framed in terms of mental 
causation. I‘ve suggested that self-agency is a matter of degree and that it can 
be won or lost in the varying contexts of interaction – contexts from which I can 
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distance myself through a narrative process that allows for strong evaluation. 
Accordingly, self-agency and related phenomena such as free will and intention 
formation – these are not things that pertain strictly to an individual; rather, 
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